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Book Review
Designing Criminal Tribunals: Sovereignty
and International Concerns in the Protection
of Human Rights, by Steven D. Roper and
Lilian A. Barria
Publisher: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. (2006)
Price: $100
Reviewed by: Zachary D. Kaufman
Steven D. Roper and Lilian A. Barria, professors in the Department of
Political Science at Eastern Illinois University, are frequent collaborators on
scholarly work concerning criminal tribunals. Their co-authored articles
and joint conference presentations on assorted aspects of this topic have
culminated in Designing Criminal Tribunals, a book that examines various ad
hoc tribunals, primarily those created since the end of the Cold War. These
tribunals include the United Nations International Criminal Tribunals for
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR), both international
tribunals; the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), the Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), and the Special Crimes
Panel for East Timor (SCPET), all mixed tribunals; and the Indonesian
Human Rights Court (IHRC), a purely domestic court.
Observing that "[ijnternational law, tribunals and law enforcement
mechanisms have developed unevenly in the 20th century as a reflection of
political realities,"1 Roper and Barria argue "that legal concerns are
embedded within a political process (either domestic or international) in
which rights and obligations are redefined based on political necessity." 2
This point, vocalized by many others in the literature on international
criminal law and transitional justice, reflects a realist view of international
relations that highlights the epiphenomenal nature, or secondary role, of
international law vis-a-vis world politics. And the authors certainly make
1. STEVEN D. ROPER & LILIAN A. BARRIA, DESIGNING CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: SOVEREIGNTY
AND INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS IN THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (2006).
2. Id. at 2.
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their case, by convincingly showing that the general evolution in tribunal
construction since the early 1990s-from purely international to mixed to
purely domestic -reflects states' changing preferences based on matters
quite separate from principles of law and justice, such as financial
considerations and assertions of state sovereignty.
While Designing Criminal Tribunals provides important information and
analysis about several critical aspects of its six key case studies, including
their financial bases and completion strategies (Chapters Five and Six,
respectively, which are the two strongest chapters), it suffers from two
major weaknesses. The first is that the book adds little original research to
this important topic. By drawing heavily upon secondary sources, Roper
and Barria deliver little more than a summary of the existing literature on
this topic.
The second major weakness of the book is that it is methodologically
unsound. The logic is arbitrary, and readers are left pondering the true
focus of the project and its rationale. One methodological problem of this
book is its narrow transitional justice option selection. Why the authors
chose to focus on examining only ad hoc tribunals, given the self-described
purpose of their project, remains unclear. Roper and Barria rightly argue,
"To hold individuals accountable for their crimes under international law
in a meaningful way requires the creation and the implementation of
mechanisms designed to provide justice."3 However, the authors proceed
to announce that they will exclusively focus on ad hoc tribunals. Certainly,
there are many other ways to address suspected international criminals,
but Roper and Barria make no effort to explain why the essentially
contested concepts of "accountability" and "justice" -which the authors do
not acknowledge as such until the end of the book4- are defined so
narrowly, or whether alternative mechanisms are somehow less
"meaningful" in providing those objectives.
For example, prosecutorial mechanisms other than ad hoc tribunals do
exist, such as permanent domestic courts claiming universal jurisdiction
over individuals (as in the recent attempt by a Spanish judge to arrest and
extradite from the United Kingdom the now late Chilean General Augusto
Pinochet). Truth commissions have also been popular and effective means
of promoting certain objectives of transitional justice, such as establishing a
historical account of heinous crimes. Examples of such institutions include
the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission and its less
famous counterparts formed or at least contemplated in Argentina, Bolivia,
Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama, Peru, and three of the
regions under consideration in this book (East Timor, the former
Yugoslavia, and Sierra Leone). These alternative prosecutorial, civil, and
non-legalistic transitional justice mechanisms offer procedural and
substantive benefits, as well as drawbacks. A more complete analysis of the
political and practical reality a society faces when confronting its past
3. Id.
4. Id. at 95.
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would include an explanation of whether other transitional justice options
were considered and why plausible alternatives were rejected.
A second methodological weakness of the book is its narrow
transitional justice case selection. It is unclear why the authors chose to
focus on examining these ad hoc tribunals, also given the summary of their
enterprise. Why did the authors not also explore the International Military
Tribunal (IMT, also known as the Nuremberg Tribunal), the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE, also known as the Tokyo
Tribunal), and other ad hoc tribunals in greater detail? Furthermore, why
did the authors choose to analyze only one purely domestic response to
human rights violations, the IHRC?
The back cover informs readers: "This book traces the development of
international humanitarian law especially since World War II and focuses
on the role of the international community in crafting international and
mixed war crimes tribunals." This description suggests an examination of
the establishment of the IMT and the IMTFE with as much rigor and space
as it does the ICTR, the ICTY, the SCSL, the ECCC, and the SCPET. Yet
Roper and Barria fall victim to the trend of much secondary literature on
this topic by not committing more of their efforts to exploring and
reflecting upon the significance of the twin post-World War II tribunals.
Indeed, the authors devote less than two pages to documenting the
establishment of the IMT and only one page to the creation of the IMTFE. 5
Both efforts offer disappointingly -and, in terms of the book's purported
goal, detrimentally -brief summaries of the chronology of events; neither
provides any new information or analysis of the circumstances that led to
the creation and operation of these tribunals. Especially because the IMT
and the IMTFE were the first ad hoc international criminal tribunals-and
since they served as such important precedents for the later tribunals
which are more of the focus of the book- a lengthier analysis of their
etiology and legacy would have strengthened the book's argument. After
all, the path dependency formed by these two models provides a
compelling explanation for the design of the later tribunals and also serves
as a starting point for analyzing the differing forms those later tribunals
took.
The book's preface opens with the claim that by spring 2002 "no
volume explored the origins, the structure and the influence of all the
newly created international and hybrid criminal tribunals."6 This
description of the genesis of Designing Criminal Tribunals implies that the
book would be concerned with more than just ad hoc tribunals and that the
world's first permanent international war crimes tribunal, the International
Criminal Court (ICC), therefore should have been a major case study. But
even though the ICC was not a case study of Designing Criminal Tribunals,
this permanent tribunal with potentially worldwide jurisdiction
undermines the authors' attempt to generalize the recent evolution of
5. Id. at 6-8.
6. Id. at vii.
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tribunal construction as tilting towards domestic courts. Where the ICC is
briefly mentioned, the authors make an erroneous assertion, claiming
"Once the ICTY and the ICTR fulfill their mandates, all future international
prosecutions involving the criminality of individuals will be adjudicated
by the ICC."7 In fact, we have many reasons to believe that alternative
transitional justice mechanisms will continue to be used, including that the
ICC will be limited by its own jurisdiction, capacity, and discretion in the
number and type of cases it will try.8
Other recently created tribunals also receive little or no mention in the
book. Roper and Barria claim that their book "examines all the ad hoc
tribunals created since the early 1990s"9 and then proceed to focus on just
six. The reader is left wondering why other significant ad hoc tribunals,
particularly the Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST), are not discussed. The IST,
which recently completed a controversial trial of Saddam Hussein by
sentencing him to death by hanging, is a particularly curious omission
since the book's very first paragraph mentions Saddam twice. The authors
argue that his trial, along with that of Slobodan Milo~evi , "represent[s]
flawed justice in which either the defendant has been able to prolong and
subvert the process or is a victim of 'victor's justice'."10 For a book that
dedicates an entire chapter to understanding the effectiveness of
international, hybrid, and domestic tribunals, this comment misleadingly
implies that the IST would figure prominently in the narrative.
Moreover, neither of the descriptions included in the back cover or
preface mentions domestic tribunals, and yet the IHRC is one of the book's
six case studies. Either these descriptions should have explicitly included
domestic tribunals or the book should have limited the discussion of the
IHRC. If the former route were taken, more domestic courts that have and
have not operated alongside international and hybrid tribunals should
have been explored. As is, the highly controversial ad hoc U.S. military
commissions are not mentioned and the War Crimes Chamber in the Court
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Rwanda's gacaca courts are discussed only
briefly.
The book's preface may help explain the narrow selection of case
studies in this volume. The authors note that they conducted fieldwork in
The Hague, Cambodia, and Indonesia. These experiences would naturally
direct their work towards the ICTY, based in The Hague; the ECCC, the
SCPET, and the IHRC; and, perhaps also the ICTR, which shares the ICTY's
appeals chamber. But there is no indication that the authors even
attempted to conduct fieldwork in Africa, where two of their case studies
are located. To promote the intellectual integrity of this project, and to
better explain their case selection, the authors should have admitted they
chose case studies with which they were most familiar.
7. Id. at 96.
8. See Zachary D. Kaufman, The Future of Transitional Justice, 1 ST. ANTONY'S INTL REV, 58,
71-72 (2005).
9. ROPER & BARRIA, supra note 1, at 2.
10. Id. at 1.
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All of this arbitrariness could have been resolved by expanding the
book. The current edition, excluding the appendices, is not even 100 pages.
Readers could certainly benefit from a revised edition that considers
additional cases or at least offers a more compelling explanation for why
this work is so narrowly focused.
By focusing only on a subset of cases within a subset of options, Roper
and Barria restrict the universe of data they collect and the observations
they share. Of course, perhaps no single volume could address the myriad
transitional justice institutions and experiences. But even considering the
book's actual content, it is still problematic. For example, the case study of
the ICTR is poorly developed. Although, as the authors describe, Rwanda's
Organic Law initially divided suspects into four categories," those
classifications have now been consolidated into three.'2 The custody battle
between the ICTR and the Rwandan government over defendants arises
not only because of the absence of a death penalty option in the UN
tribunal, as Roper and Barria speculate, 13 but also because the Rwandan
government has had concerns over the ICTR's operation. For example, the
ICTR has previously hired genocide suspects as staff members, 4 and
judges have failed to treat witnesses with the respect they deserve, on one
occasion laughing at a witness testifying about the rape she suffered. 15 The
Rwandan government's initial objections to the ICTR were not merely
based on the tribunal's temporal and subject-matter jurisdictions and the
absence of the death penalty, as the authors claim.16 From the Rwandan
government's perspective, the ICTR did not include enough trial chamber
judges and problematically shared an appeals chamber and chief
prosecutor with the ICTY; the UN Security Council member states that
participated in the Rwandan conflict would wrongly have power to
propose and vote on judicial candidates; suspects and convicts would
inappropriately be held in states outside of Rwanda; and the ICTR should
have been located in Rwanda instead of in neighboring Tanzania. 7
Beyond the flawed methodology and analysis, the book is marked by
general sloppiness. The editing is poor, as evidenced by several arithmetic,
spelling, and nomenclature mistakes.18 Designing Criminal Tribunals,
published in 2006, also refers to past events as occurring in the future. 9
11. Id. at 25, 78.
12. See Phil Clark, Hybridity, Holism and "Traditional" Justice: The Case of the Gacaca Courts in
Post-Genocide Rwanda, 39 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).
13. ROPER & BARRIA, supra note 1, at 25.
14. See Victor Peskin, Rwandan Ghosts, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Sept.-Oct. 2002, at 21.
15. See Valerie Oosterveld, Gender-Sensitive Justice and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda: Lessons Learned for the International Criminal Court, 12 NEW ENG. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
119, 130 n.55 (2005).
16. ROPER & BARRIA, supra note 1, at 23-24.
17. U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 13-16, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453 (Nov. 8,1994).
18. For example, the authors refer to four international tribunals, whereas the book
analyzes five. Roper & Barria, supra note 1, at 3. Furthermore, throughout the book, the
authors mistakenly refer to the ECCC (the proper name of this tribunal, as indicated in the
primary documents in Appendix F) as the Extraordinary Chambers for Cambodia (ECC).
19. For example, the authors claim the ECCC is "the only tribunal that will be established
5
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This latter problem can be explained by the fact that much of the book is
directly reproduced from the authors' previous work. Roper and Barria co-
authored related articles in Human Rights Review, the International Journal of
Human Rights, and the Journal of Human Rights, 2 0 journals they thank "for
allowing us to use ideas from these publications." 21 More than merely
reusing their ideas, however, much of the book is a verbatim reprint of these
recently published articles. While scholars often draw upon their previous
work in later anthologies, they usually do so with updated material and
new insight, or only as part of a greater work. The minimal changes the
authors made from earlier iterations of their work, added to the fact that
the book is relatively short, raise the question: why did the authors not add
more value to their previous publications?
The authors should be commended for raising awareness about the
phenomenon and challenges of ad hoc tribunals. As Roper and Barria
rightly point out in their final chapter, the effectiveness of these tribunals is
difficult to assess because there are myriad rationales for and expectations
of them, which may sometimes conflict or be unrealistic. The authors are
also appropriately sensitive to contextual circumstances, arguing that their
case studies "demonstrate that there is no one model that fits all
situations.""'
However, Designing Criminal Tribunals adds little value to the literature
on international criminal law and transitional justice because Roper and
Barria rehash and regurgitate so much of others'-and their own-work.
Furthermore, the book is confused about its exact purpose. In not clearly
providing a rationale for its chosen case studies, the book reads as a
disjointed set of reflections on a topic that is too important not to treat
more rigorously. Roper and Barria's next book together is entitled The
Development of Institutions of Human Rights. Such a similarly broad and
ambitious subject will require an amount of documentation and a depth of
analysis lacking in their first co-authored volume.
after the entry into force of the ICC in 2002." Id. at 30. Furthermore, this statement has been
proven false, as evidenced by the fact that the IST was created in 2003.
20. Lilian A. Barria & Steven D. Roper, Assessing the Record of Justice: A Comparison of Mixed
International Tribunals versus Domestic Mechanisms for Human Rights Enforcement 4 J. HUM. RTS.
521 (2005); Lilian A. Barria & Steven D. Roper, How Effective are International Criminal
Tribunals? An Analysis of the ICTY and the ICTR, 9 INT'L J. HuM. RTS. 349 (2005); Lilian A. Barria
& Steven D. Roper, Providing Justice and Reconciliation: The Criminal Tribunals for Sierra Leone
and Cambodia, 7 HUM. RTs. REv. 5 (2005).
21. ROPER & BARRIA, supra note 1, at viii.
22. Id. at 94.
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Law, Infrastructure, and Human Rights,
by Michael B. Likosky
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (2006)
Price: $35
Reviewed by: Rubina Madni
Shortly after Royal Dutch Shell first discovered natural gas in Peru in
1980, the Peruvian government contracted with Shell and Mobil to exploit
the reserves, with the hopes of bringing great wealth to the impoverished
South American country by making it a net exporter of hydrocarbons. The
project involved the construction of a pipeline that would cut through the
land of many indigenous communities in the Amazon rain forest, however,
and human rights activists mounted numerous campaigns against the gas
companies and banks that financed the project. Shell and Mobil eventually
pulled out of the project due to disagreements with the Peruvian
government over issues like pricing, but the concern for human rights that
came to the forefront during this time remained a prominent issue
connecting to and sometimes clashing with Peru's development agenda.
The advancement of human rights and standards of living are
predicated on the development of infrastructure, which allows access to
such basic necessities as water, shelter, electricity, and food. The
relationship between infrastructure and human rights is not perfectly
harmonious, however, because in the course of developing infrastructure
projects, human rights -such as those of indigenous Amazon communities
during the above-mentioned Camisea project-are often compromised.
Michael B. Likosky's Law, Infrastructure, and Human Rights analyzes the
complex interplay between human rights and the development of
infrastructure projects through transnational public-private partnerships
(PPPs).
Following a thorough explanation of the technical aspects of the
finance, construction, and operation stages of infrastructure projects,
Likosky examines how human rights concerns are handled in the context
of international privatized infrastructure projects. Analyzing the linkages
between PPPs, compound corporations, and human rights risks through
7
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five case studies-Iraq, antiterrorism, banks, EU enlargement, and
antipoverty- Likosky explores how legal strategies address development-
generated human rights concerns in practice, and suggests ways in which
the nature of the relationship between transnational PPPs and human
rights can be improved.
Some explanation of terminology is called for here, and Likosky
provides it. A PPP is an infrastructure project that is privatized but
includes a substantial public element. Likosky's particular focus is on
transnational PPPs, infrastructure projects that include a foreign element,
such as a bank or company. The companies which execute the PPP's
work-Shell and Mobil under the Peruvian scheme, for example-are
known as "compound corporations." The concept of "human rights risk"
involves the probability that human rights considerations will adversely
interfere with the implementation of an infrastructure project. (From the
perspective of affected communities, of course, the concern is whether
infrastructure projects will interfere with their human rights.) Several "risk
mitigation strategies" are available to mitigate the potential harm posed to
an infrastructure project by human rights risks: among them, transnational
litigation, NGOs that target companies directly, market-based strategies
such as ethics codes, and political risk insurance. For instance, when
human rights NGOs and community groups targeted the Camisea project,
Shell and Mobil responded with an innovative and comprehensive plan to
address human rights concerns, prevent the project from disrupting the
lives of the indigenous villages, and solicit input about the project from
local communities.
While Likosky presents the classic story of human rights strategists
reacting to a PPP in the context of the Camisea project, he shows that
opposition to PPPs is not always rooted in concern for human rights. In the
chapters on postwar Iraq and antiterrorism, Likosky shows that terrorist
groups, whose goals are clearly counter to those of human rights groups,
also target PPPs in order to garner social change; in turn PPPs can at times
constitute one element of an antiterror strategy. In Iraq, for instance, the
United States government responded to insurgents' attacks on
infrastructure projects by implementing non-military counterinsurgency
practices, including the subcontracting of infrastructure projects to Iraqi
companies so as to provide Iraqis jobs. This strategy, embracing the use of
transnational PPPs, was a break from the customary U.S. practice of
subcontracting exclusively to American firms.
One of Likosky's key arguments is that the existence of a centralized
authority facilitates the work of human rights strategists. In his chapter on
EU enlargement, he notes that since the EU will assess the economic and
social impacts of projects, it will be easier for human rights activists to
launch effective campaigns aimed toward a centralized authority, as
opposed to individually targeting each of the numerous different actors -
domestic and foreign banks, governments, and multinational
corporations -that are often involved in PPPs. In the aggregate, Likosky
lauds the move toward centralization as a step towards greater respect for
[Vol. 10
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human rights norms in the financing, construction, and operating stages of
infrastructure projects in new member states.
In the book's final chapter, this concept is carried into his policy
recommendation for a centralized Human Rights Unit (HRU) to be carried
out under the auspices of the United Nations. The HRU, he suggests,
should handle all human rights issues that arise under the context of
transnational PPPs and should act as a decisional forum, setting human
rights standards for international infrastructure PPPs and monitoring
compliance with those standards. Currently, human rights NGOs and
community groups target PPP planners through human rights risk
strategies, driving reform and setting new standards for the human rights
implications of infrastructure projects on a case-by-case basis. This system
is deficient because, while project planners may agree to certain standards,
their compliance is not adequately monitored. Moreover, as demonstrated
by the diverse array of case studies that Likosky examines, infrastructure
projects are carried out in a broad array of contexts and it is not always
clear what the appropriate human rights standard is or how a human
rights standard should be implemented in a particular project. The HRU
would remedy the current situation: project planners would be closely
scrutinized, their compliance with human rights norms evenly monitored
and enforced. A common standard would exist, but could be adapted by
experts to diverse contexts such as reconstruction in Iraq or EU
enlargement.
Along similar lines, the HRU would address uneven human rights
standards between countries. In the second phase of Camisea, after Shell
and Mobil's withdrawal, NGOs focused their opposition to the project by
targeting the banks that financed it. They managed to block financing from
the United States Export-Import Bank, which has the highest human rights
standards of all export agencies. But project planners managed to secure
funds from other countries, where such funds were not tied to human
rights scrutiny. Under Likosky's proposal, a project like Camisea would be
submitted to the HRU in order to produce an unvarying human rights risk
assessment of the project.
While the HRU is a noble aspiration with scores of potential benefits, it
is unclear from Likosky's proposal whether the HRU could change the
practices of states that reject the conditioning of development aid on
human rights. China, for instance, doles out money sans human rights
scrutiny across Africa in order to meet its tremendous need for resources.
China's own dismal domestic human rights record is mirrored in its
foreign policy, where lack of concern for human rights standards is
manifested in China's ongoing support for the Sudanese government
despite charges of genocide. It is overly optimistic to expect that the
regularized, aspirational human rights standards devised by the HRU
would be respected by the Chinese government in its financing of
infrastructure projects. While the HRU policy is promising for many
circumstances, its efficacy in helping to actualize human rights in the
context of PPPs that are executed by habitual human rights offenders is
2007]
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doubtful.
Alongside the perhaps excessive idealism evident in Likosky's Human
Rights Unit proposal, several other weaknesses temper what is otherwise a
thought-provoking analysis of the relationship between infrastructure and
human rights. For instance, in attempting to explain how governments use
PPPs in response to terrorist threats in Chapter Five, he fails to define some
key terms upon which his argument turns. He argues that governments
can use PPPs in counterterrorism by reaching out to Islamic countries,
building contractual relationships with them so as to reduce terrorist
threats from the region. He further proposes the financing of projects
through "Islamic techniques" premised on PPPs.
A book on human rights should ideally be attuned to the nuances
inherent in a dynamic and complex segment of the global village. What are
"Islamic finance techniques" and how might they differ from other forms
of financing? Moreover, what are "Islamic funds"? Are they funds that are
raised through the Zakat, the alms-giving that is compulsory on Muslims?
Or are they funds that are generated in predominantly Muslim countries?
Likosky uses blanket terms such as these in his argument but fails to define
them, thus weakening the clarity of his argument.
From the perspective of an individual who has a basic understanding
of the theories of human rights law and is seeking straightforward
introduction to the interplay and tension between human rights law and
infrastructure projects, another major weakness of the book is its overly
technical explanation of transnational PPPs. While the first two chapters
about the technical framework are undoubtedly crucial, Likosky devotes
too much time expounding on technical details of infrastructure projects,
their financing, and the historical trajectory of PPPs. This discussion is
largely unhelpful in furthering his arguments on infrastructure and human
rights and risks losing the more legally minded reader.
Despite these weaknesses, Law, Infrastructure, and Human Rights deftly
analyzes how transnational PPP projects, executed by compound
corporations in very diverse contexts, are adapted so as to respect human
rights norms in response to efforts by targeted human rights risk strategies.
After reading the case studies, the reader is able to fully appreciate the
complex human rights problems involved in transnational PPPs and the
difficulties that present themselves to human rights activists in addressing
those concerns. The solution Likosky presents - a Human Rights Unit to
evaluate and monitor PPPs - is promising, but not entirely adequate to
address the universe of actors willing to compromise human rights in the
interests of financial benefits.
[Vol. 10
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Law and Disorder in the Postcolony,
edited by Jean Comaroff and John L.
Comaroff
Publisher: University of Chicago Press (2006)
Price: $28
Reviewed by: Sarah Mehta
On February 8, 2007, 6-year-old JoAo Helio Fernandes Vieites was
murdered in Rio de Janeiro when armed teenagers carjacked his family's
car at a traffic light. As the child struggled to get out of his seatbelt and out
the open car door, the assailants drove off, dragging Jodo Helio's body for
several miles before abandoning the dismembered remains.
In recounting this horrific murder, media accounts -particularly the
international reports-fixated on the overwhelming outcry of the city's
inhabitants. In a city inured to violence, reporters asked, why the
exceptional outrage in this particular case? Stepping back even further,
how did collective dispassion become the predicted response to sensational
violence and police paralysis?
The collected essays in Law and Disorder in the Postcolony intervene in
this conversation, further complicating perceptions of public cynicism
towards "law and order" in postcolonial societies. Disorder, as utilized by
the authors, denotes endemic lawlessness and is illustrated by violence and
extra-legal activities. But this crisis in governance does not signify
indifference towards law, its power and institutions. Through case studies
conducted in a diverse spectrum of postcolonial states, the authors
demonstrate that law and its accoutrements continue to capture popular
imaginings, despite repeated failures to reflect or govern the local realities.
One of the ironies that the authors attempt to explicate is the fact that
mounting criminal violence and illicit economic practices are not a
"rejoinder" to the law, nor do they prove popular disillusionment with the
normative or ethical power of law. As editors Jean Comaroff and John L.
Comaroff claim in their introduction, "[L]aw has been further fetishized,
even as, in most postcolonies, higher and higher walls are built to protect
the propertied from lawlessness, even as the language of legality insinuates
11
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itself deeper and deeper into the realm of the illicit."' "Legality," they
claim, is the measure of ethical and legitimate action; but governments no
longer have a monopoly on the vocabulary and provision of law and
rights. Postcolonial states attempt to establish sovereignty armed with
sophisticated jurisprudence and constitutions; extralegal or criminal actors
simultaneously foster "the counterfeiting of a culture of legality." The
distinction between licit and illicit actors collapses as states increasingly
outsource responsibility for government services like security to private
actors; responding to the retreat of the state, extralegal actors mimic the
state and the market "by providing protection and dispensing justice." 2
One reading of the persistence of disorder and criminality in
postcolonial states blames existing government institutions as faulty or
insufficiently democratic, absent a "culture of legality." This theory rests on
the notion that the development of such a "culture," with all the
legitimizing trappings of a functioning judiciary, democratically elected
government, and constitutionally enshrined civil rights, will buttress
society against criminality and the slippery slope to anarchy. Several
authors in this volume illustrate the uncomfortable "coincidence of
democratization and criminal violence" 3 and the growing realization that
this comforting dichotomy -of criminal violence on one side and rule of
law on the other -is illusory. A more insidious narrative, iterated in many
of the essays, points to the prevalence of criminal violence and corruption
in the United States, Russia, the Netherlands and other industrialized
nations supposedly immune to the flagrant criminality seen in postcolonial
states; the more visible and globally condemned criminality in postcolonial
states, then, is not a temporary stage on the path to "mature"
democratization.
Democracy does not automatically end violence. If anything, the case
studies suggest that the arrival of a democratic state signals the end of
"legitimate violence" (of a social movement against a shared political
target) and its replacement with unsanctioned and unstructured forms of
violence. Indeed, the democratic state and its legitimizing activities can
themselves serve as the amphitheatre for further violence. Teresa P. R.
Caldeira notes that in Brazil, despite the extension of political rights to
inhabitants of "the periphery", the state has proved incapable of providing
physical safety, particularly for black men.4 Even with the expansion and
growing sophistication of civil rights in Brazil, the language of rights and
with it, state protection, has been limited by class and race. The argument
is not that democracy independently produces violence or a contraction of
rights; rather, democracy provides new tools that empower some of its
1. JEAN COMAROFF & JOHN L. COMAROFF, INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND DISORDER IN THE
POSTCOLONY 22 (Jean Comaroff & John L. Comaroff eds., 2006) [hereinafter LAW AND
DISORDER].
2. Id. at 34.
3. Id. at 2.
4. Teresa P. R. Caldeira, I Came to Sabotage Your Reasoning!: Violence and Resignifications of
Justice in Brazil, in LAW AND DISORDER, supra note 1, at 102, 136-38.
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beneficiaries to exclude others from state protection. These "others" tend to
be those most in need of state support and an affirmative declaration of
their equality as rights-bearing citizens. For the already marginalized,
democracy might constitute no more than another procedure for exclusion.
Looking at the iconic moment of democratic affirmation - the
election - Achille Mbembe contests the normative conception of politics as
"a means of rejecting war and sublimating conflict and violence"5 and
elections as performative proof that violence has been replaced as the
"collectively validated procedure to vie for power." 6 Instead, elections
provide another moment of provocation: "The liturgy meant to symbolize
the overtaking of conflict and violence turns out to be the specter that,
paradoxically, continues to haunt society, bringing dissension to the heart
of the 'community,' in the form of threat of impending war or of fraud or
of division and discord." 7 In Nigeria today the stage is set for the
archetypal political violence that Mbembe evokes; a month before the
elections, dozens of people have already been killed in political attacks.
Pervasive criminal activity does not, however, entail a complete
rejection of law, the market or other forms of social collectivity. The
elusiveness of a bright-line notion of "the lawful" complicates censure of
some activities as criminal. Janet Roitman's interviews with smugglers in
the Chad Basin demonstrate the inappropriateness of a rigorous dichotomy
between licit and illicit activities. For smugglers operating across the
boundaries of Chad, Sudan, Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Central African
Republic, the distinction between legal and illegal trading is technically
and even morally irrelevant. Allegedly lawful actors like customs officials,
the police, and businessmen routinely engage in illegal economic transfers
like bribes, and licit activities are not radically different from illicit ones;
"military refugees," i.e. soldiers no longer needed by formal national
armies, easily become mercenaries or join "private" security forces, trading
the same weapons and participating in the same activities. Roitman is
careful to point out that the various participants in this informal sector do
not position themselves in opposition to the state's moral and legal
authority via the creation of a parallel, rival political regime. Instead, she
suggests, the smugglers/traffickers/bandits, "seek a certain mode of
integration by partaking in recognized modes of governing the economy." 8
Perhaps more disturbingly, Rosalind C. Morris invokes a similar situation
in the democratic state of South Africa, where well-established legal
institutions and actors have not been able to contain chronic violence.
According to Morris, declining legitimate political violence coincides with
the replacement of the police with private security companies and
5. Achille Mbembe, On Politics as a Form of Expenditure, in LAW AND DISORDER, supra note
1, at 299, 312.
6. Id. at 313.
7. Id. at 313-14.
8. Janet Roitman, The Ethics of Illegality in the Chad Basin, in LAW AND DISORDER, supra note
1, at 247, 259.
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"incompletely commercialized vigilante forces." 9
One of the most subtle but compelling themes of this collection is the
elusiveness of any correlative story about licit and ethical activities. This is
not a book about postcolonial civil disobedience, and the authors
successfully resist any temptation to look to extralegal institutions, actors,
or economies as sites of civic resistance. In the absence of justifiable and
meaningful authority, non-state actors emerge to fulfill some of the state's
traditional roles. But the collected stories in this volume reveal that the
host of ready successors to the state-i.e. private corporations, religious
organizations, militias, gangs, transnational smuggler networks, and so
on-do not attempt to establish themselves as more democratic or even
effective replacements to collapsing state authority.
Nancy Scheper-Hughes offers a haunting account of the hunger for
effective authority in Timbafiba, Brazil, where she has worked with street
children for over two decades. Her essay traces the cycle of violence that
first causes the children's homelessness and victimization and later engulfs
them as perpetrators of this same terror until their eventual, and almost
inevitable, murder at the hands of death squads (informal vigilante
groups). These groups are shielded by community members and espoused
as justiceiros or "representatives of popular justice" 10 in part out of
gratitude for the protection the death squads provide, in part due to a
general endorsement of these social cleansing (limpeza) campaigns. This
tragic collusion of the poor with the "authors of their own extrajudicial
executions""1 illustrates a troubling and desperate attempt to create some
order-even an unjust one-in the absence of legitimate and concerned
state authority.
In situations where the state resists its increasing insignificance as rule-
maker and rights-giver and attempts to confront its rivals directly, crisis
erupts where the modern state's resource base and vocabulary are not
equipped to tackle local conflicts and win. Peter Geschiere exposes the
limits of the Cameroonian judiciary in the face of resurgent witchcraft. The
state feels compelled to take action against the leaders of witch-hunts in
order to reassert its primacy as the "law and order" authority but is not
equipped to establish effective command. To apprehend the leaders of
witch-hunts, the state must first criminalize some of their activities; this
project requires the assistance of local experts in magic (inyanga), whose
work and authority is often indistinguishable from the witchcraft they are
hired to condemn. In partnering with these questionable authorities, the
state damages its prestige in the eyes of its populace, who expect that "the
new government should know what to do about witchcraft."1 2 Worse still,
9. Rosalind C. Morris, The Mute and the Unspeakable: Political Subjectivity, Violent Crime, and
"the Sexual Thing" in a South African Mining Community, in LAW AND DISORDER, supra note 1, at
57, 83.
10. Nancy Scheper-Hughes, Death Squads and Democracy in Northeast Brazil, in LAW AND
DISORDER, supra note 1, at 150, 169.
11. Id. at 157.
12. Peter Geschiere, Witchcraft and the Limits of the Law, in LAW AND DISORDER, supra note
1, at 219, 221.
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the state displays this handicap in its own forum of authority -the court -
thus undermining the standing of that institution.
As the state's ambit of authority and activity contracts, the space for
extra-legal activities expands. Activities outside the legally permissible
sphere increasingly constitute the majority of economic, social and political
activities. Writes Mbembe: "To the fragmentation of public power there
will respond, like an echo, the constitution, multiplication, and
dissemination of nodes of conflict within society. New arenas of power will
gradually emerge as survival imperatives come to emphasize the
increasing autonomy of the spheres of social and individual life." 13 This
autonomy, Mbembe suggests, is less demonstrative of a vibrant civil
society than of the retreat of conventional public authority; the subsequent
void is readily filled by actors who need not claim to be transparent or
accountable.
For a legal audience, this collection of anthropological essays might
beget the question, "What's law got to do with this?" The anthropologists
contributing to the book ask the same thing: what does law have to do with
life, security, and democracy for inhabitants of postcolonial nation-states?
Why the insistence on law and its institutions when their actual relevance
and practice seems so elusive?
These questions, often reiterated and complicated in the articles, are
not satisfactorily answered. The essays are provocative and richly
descriptive in their narratives; but overall the authors settle for a
comparatively thin explanation of the postcolonial obsession with law as
aspirational in the face of pervasive disorder. The concepts of legality
bandied around by the authors and their informants form a spectral
(omni-) presence hovering over the narratives; yet we learn little about the
legal machinery, actors, and mobilizations to which they are attached. This
gap between Law as an icon and law as a program or tool is in part the
point of the book but is still dissatisfying for a reader that wants to know
where law can be rectified and revitalized as a source of social justice and
not simply a spectator to its own demise.
The protests after Joao Helio's death in Rio de Janeiro suggest a desire
for law to live up to its transformative power as champion of social justice.
Even if the law has yet to corroborate these aspirations, it remains the only
affirmative tool available absent more compelling alternatives.
13. Mbembe, supra note 5, at 311-12.
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